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Abstract: In the current paper, we examine the effect of a B2B spot market on the strategic behavior
and the performance of a reseller who continues to use the traditional channel while participating in a B2B
spot market. We analyze the case in which a risk-neutral reseller faces an additive or multiplicative demand
function and identify sufficient conditions under which the optimal order quantity and retail price exist and
are unique. We then analytically examine the case in which a risk-averse reseller participates in a fully liquid
spot market. We also study numerically how varying liquidity, spot price volatility, demand variability, and
correlation coefficient affect a firm’s strategies and performance. We find that demand variability significantly
affects both pricing and ordering strategies, whereas the spot price volatility has less influence on pricing
decisions. Our results also show that for a risk-averse reseller to charge a lower retail price when the spot
market liquidity increases is desirable. We further show that a B2B spot market cannot always improve a
reseller’s utility. These findings shed light on how resellers can adjust their procurement and pricing strategies
to align with the new business environment created by the emergence of B2B spot markets, as well as have
obvious implications for the development of a B2B spot market.
Keywords: Supply chain management; Procurement and pricing strategy; B2B spot market; Market
liquidity; Risk
1. Introduction
Many organizations predicted that B2B spot markets (online spot markets or e-marketplaces) would
have a grand future (e.g., Gartner Group 2004 and e-Marketer 2002). However, the development
of B2B spot markets has not been smooth. Expected by many to be the next major innovation
in business, many B2B spot markets sprang up virtually overnight between 1999 and 2000, and a
tremendous amount of capital was poured in (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000). However, the frenzied
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2development came to a halt by the end of 2000 (Grey et al. 2005). During these gloomy years, many
B2B spot markets failed or were merged (Brunn et al. 2002). The boom and burst of the dot com
during that period created skepticism about the future of B2B spot markets. However, many did
not lose hope, and the development continues until today. In recent years, hundreds of B2B spot
markets have opened or reopened on the Internet. Many commodity products, such as commodity
metal, chemical products, semiconductors, plastics, and agricultural products, are traded over B2B
spot markets. In China alone, over 100 B2B spot markets have been established since 2000, many
of which have achieved reasonable success. BOCE (www.boce.cn, Tianjin), a leading B2B spot
market for crude oil, coke, and rebar, has achieved an average daily trading volume of more than
100,000 metric tons on rebar.
Resellers are major participants of B2B spot markets for commodity products. B2B spot markets
can be a double-edged sword to resellers. On the one hand, resellers can oﬄoad their excessive
inventories and eliminate stockout costs through B2B spot markets. They can earn additional rev-
enue by speculating (purchasing more through contracts and then selling) in B2B spot markets.
On the other hand, trading in B2B spot markets also exposes resellers to price volatility. Therefore,
to participate in a B2B spot market, a reseller needs to tailor his/her pricing and procurement
strategies to the new business environment. However, for many resellers, there is a lack of under-
standing of this evolving business environment, which may limit the participation of resellers in
the B2B spot market. Clearly, how a B2B spot market serves or is perceived to serve the reseller
needs is crucial to its success.
Another critical concern for resellers is the lack of liquidity in the B2B spot market. As many
B2B spot markets are still in their early development stage, most of them cannot provide buyers
or sellers with perfect matches. In such business environment, resellers cannot effectively oﬄoad
their excessive inventories or procure the shortfall in the spot market. In addition, the speculation
behavior may also be affected by the imperfectness of the spot market access. Therefore, resellers
should develop different pricing and procurement strategies for different market liquidities, but it
cannot be done properly without a clear understanding of the effect of the spot market liquidity.
3Motivated by the concerns elaborated above, we consider a single-period inventory model in
which a reseller participating in a B2B spot market faces an uncertain price-sensitive demand. The
reseller makes a procurement-quantity decision and a selling-price (retail price) decision simulta-
neously before spot trading with the objective of maximizing his/her expected utility. We consider
two types of resellers, that is, the risk-neutral reseller and the risk-averse reseller, and investigate
how the B2B spot market affects the reseller’s strategies by focusing on such characteristics as
price sensitivity, demand uncertainty, and price volatility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3
describes the basic model. Section 4 presents the strategies for a risk-neutral reseller. In Section 5,
we examine the strategies for a risk-averse reseller. We first analytically investigate optimal strate-
gies with a fully liquid B2B spot market and an additive demand function, and then numerically
investigate the effects of the B2B spot market on the reseller’s strategies. Finally in Section 6, we
give the concluding remarks and present some issues for future research.
2. Literature Review
The popularity and development of B2B spot markets have stimulated extensive research in the
last 10 years. Detailed reviews of research on B2B spot markets from a supply chain perspective
can be found in Swaminathan and Tayur (2003), Grieger (2003), Eng (2004), Grey et al. (2005),
and Hakso¨z and Seshadri (2007). Here, we only review the works closely related to this paper.
The emergence of B2B spot markets has provided manufacturers and resellers with a new business
avenue while forcing them to adjust their strategies to align with the new business environment.
Thus, a key question is how the procurement and pricing strategies of a reseller will be affected by
the presence of a B2B spot market. Motivated by HP’s Internet-based exchange TradingHub.com,
Lee and Whang (2002) use a two-period newsvendor model to explore the effect of a secondary
market, which can readjust resellers’ inventories. They show that although the sales volume of
the manufacturer may increase or decrease, the secondary market can always improve the supply
chain performance. Peleg et al. (2002) compare three procurement strategies using the long-term
4relationship-based contract, the short-term spot market, and the combination of both. They find
that the optimal strategy depends on the market characteristics. Etzion and Pinker (2008) study
the asymmetric competition between two types of suppliers in a B2B spot market environment;
one uses the combination of forward contracts and spot market, whereas the other utilizes only the
spot market. They find that the supplier with forward contracts can benefit from the spot market
more than the supplier without using forward contracts. Wu et al. (2002) examine the capacity
reservation contract strategy for a capital-intensive product. The buyer purchases a certain amount
of option contracts from the seller. On exercising day, both the buyer and the seller can sell excess
capacities or buy additional quantities in a spot market. Buyers’s optimal reservation quantity
depends on both the reservation cost and execution cost, whereas the seller’s optimal strategy
is to set the execution cost as low as possible. Spinler and Huchzermeier (2006) extend Wu et
al.’s (2002) results to the case in which the buyer’s demand function is state dependent. They
show that the combination of the option contract and the spot market is a Pareto improvement
compared with other market structures. Seifert et al. (2004) analyze the benefits of an online
spot market from the supply chain operational perspective. In their model, the buyer can procure
through forward contract or the spot market. In spot trading, the commodity can be both bought
and sold through the spot market. The optimal procurement strategies are analyzed based on
different market situations. Their result shows that a significant profit can be achieved through the
readjustment of the order quantity. Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi (2005) study a risk-averse
manufacturer’s portfolio procurement strategy option contract and having access to a spot market.
The analysis of Serel et al. (2001) and Inderfurth and Kelle (2011) of the capacity reservation in
the presence of a spot market is also an interesting source of information. The model presented in
the current paper differs from the above mentioned studies in that it incorporates optimal pricing
and ordering decisions in the presence of price-dependent stochastic demands in the resell channel
and an exogenous random price in the spot market. The reseller’s risk attitude is also considered.
These factors enable us to study from different angles the effects of a B2B spot market on the
performance and strategic behaviors of a reseller.
5Our work relates to the literature on joint ordering and pricing decisions. A recent work on this
area is by Petruzzi and Data (1999), who study a newsvendor problem in which the reseller has
to make the stocking and pricing decision simultaneously. They analyze the effect of the nature of
the stochastic demand function on the pricing and stocking decisions. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
(2003) and Yano and Gilbert (2003) examine the various related issues and provide comprehensive
reviews. Recently, Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), Ray et al. (2005), and Song et al. (2008),
among others, have studied the joint decision problem in a price-dependent stochastic setting.
Studies also address the combined pricing and ordering strategy of a risk-averse newsvendor. For
example, Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) model risk aversion with the general utility function, Chen
et al. (2007) extend Agrawal and Seshadri’s (2000) model to a multi-period setting, and Chen et
al. (2009) use CVaR as risk criteria. Our focus is different. We examine the effect of B2B spot
markets with a volatile price on the strategies and performance of a reseller.
3. Basic Model Description
We consider a one-period model in which the decisions and events form a three-stage process, as
shown in Figure 1. Before the selling season, i.e., at T0, knowing the procurement price w and facing
a random price-sensitive demand D, the reseller decides the quantity q to order through forward
contract and the retail price pr for the resell channel simultaneously. During the selling season T1,
knowing the realized demand and spot price, the reseller can sell his/her excessive inventory or buy
some extra products through the B2B spot market. After the selling season, i.e., at T2, the spot
market is closed, and the unsold surplus is salvaged at price s. To avoid trivial outcomes, we assume
that s <w. A newsvendor type model is formulated to study the procurement and pricing decision
of a reseller who faces uncertain future demand and a spot market with an uncertain exogenous
spot price. We assume that the reseller cannot reorder from the manufacturer during the selling
season. The reseller, such as catalog resellers or resellers with planned promotional campaigns,
cannot change the price during the whole selling season. These kinds of decisions under uncertainty
and risk are common in reality, and they have been studied extensively.
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Decide pr
*
 and q*
T0 T1
Demand and spot uncertainties
realized; spot trading begins;
reseller sells to customer
T2
Salavaged if possible
Fig. 1. Sequence of Events on a Timeline
Owing to the large number of participants in the spot market, individual participants cannot
manipulate the market. Therefore, the spot price pe of the product in the spot market is assumed
an exogenous stochastic variable, with mean µe and variance σ2e , and all the participants in the
spot market are price-takers. As most B2B spot markets are still at their development stage, not
many spot markets have achieved full liquidity, and as such a reseller’s order may not be completely
executed. In the current paper, we assume that when an order is placed in the spot market, it will
be executed with a probability of m, which measures the liquidity of the spot market (Kleindorfer
and Wu 2003).
The reseller’s profit function can then be expressed as follows:
pir = prD+ pem(q−D)++ s(1−m)(q−D)+− pem(D− q)+−wq− pr(1−m)(D− q)+. (1)
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) represents the revenue from the resell channel if the
demand is met in full. The second term is the revenue obtained by selling the surplus in the spot
market. The third is the salvage value of the unsold surplus. We assume that s is lower than the
realized spot price, so that the reseller will first try to salvage his/her inventory in the spot market,
as reflected by the second and third terms on the RHS 1. The fourth is the cost for procurement
shortage from the spot market, the fifth is the procurement cost through contract, and the last
represents the value of the unmet demand in the resell channel. In summary, to maintain customer
goodwill and prevent the erosion of the customer base in the resell channel, a reseller usually goes
the extra mile to meet customer demands, and he/she usually maintains a stable reselling price.
In other words, the reseller takes the risk of price volatility in the spot market and an uncertain
demand in the resell channel in return for a higher profit margin in the resell channel.
1A more general form for the second and third terms is I(pe− s)[pem+ s(1−m)](q−D)++ I(s− pe)s(q−D)+, and
I(·) is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if its argument is positive or 0 otherwise.
7We consider two types of demand functions: the additive demand function and the multiplicative
demand function. Demand is defined as D = y(pr) + ε in the additive case and D = y(pr)ε in the
multiplicative case, where y(pr) is a deterministic and decreasing function of the selling price pr,
and ε is a random factor with mean µd and standard deviation σd. Furthermore, we take the
form of y(pr) = θ − apr and y(pr) = θp−ar , where θ > 0 is the market base and a > 0 measures
the price sensitivity (Petruzzi and Dada 1999). Usually, a fixed setup/initial participation cost
is required to trade in a B2B spot market, and there are also some risk-associated costs; thus,
most small-volume end-users do not participate in the B2B spot trading. In our example, although
some large-volume end-users participate in the BOCE, over 95% of the users of BOCE are steel
distributors2. Therefore, we assume that the spot price pe does not directly affect end-user demand
D in the retail channel.
For each demand function, we consider the decisions of two types of resellers, the risk-neutral
reseller and the risk-averse reseller. In the risk-neutral case, the reseller makes decisions under the
expected value criterion. He/she intends to maximize his/her expected profit E[pir] by setting the
retail price and deciding the quantity to order from the manufacturer. In the risk-averse case, the
reseller intends to maximize his/her mean–variance utility. Thus, in this case, the reseller’s decision
problem is
max
pr, q>0
Ur =E[pir]− kV ar[pir], (2)
where k > 0 represents the reseller’s risk attitude. Mean–variance utility is first proposed in the
seminal work of Markowitz (1959), and it has been widely adopted by some operations management
studies, such as Chen and Federgruen (2000), Ding et al. (2007), and Buzacott et al. (2011). To
study the effect of online spot market, Seifert et al. (2004), Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi
(2006), and Dong and Liu (2007) also use mean–variance to measure risk exposure. An alternative
approach to model risk aversion is by the expected utility framework. Van Mieghem (2003) provides
an extensive discussion of utility theory and mean–variance analysis.
2More detailed information can be found in the annual reports of the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing:
China Logistics Development Report (2009− 2010) and (2010− 2011), China Logistics Publishing House, Beijing.
84. Strategies of a Risk-neutral Reseller
In this section, we consider the case in which the reseller is risk-neutral (k= 0). Let F (·) and f(·)
represent CDF and PDF of ε, respectively, and assume that this distribution has support on [A,B]
with 0≤A<B. Let r(x) = f(x)/[1−F (x)] be the hazard rate of the distribution F (·).
Following Petruzzi and Dada (1999), we denote z ≡ q− y(pr) in the additive demand case. The
profit function can be rewritten as
pir(z, pr) =
{
pr[y(pr)+ ε]−w[y(pr)+ z] + [(1−m)s+mpe](z− ε), ε≤ z,
pr[y(pr)+ z]−w[y(pr)+ z]−m(pe− pr)(ε− z), ε > z.
Define Λ(z) =
∫ z
A
(z−x)f(x)dx and Θ(z) = ∫ B
z
(x−z)f(x)dx. If ε is independent of pe, the expected
profit can be written as follows:
E[pir(z, pr)] =Ψ(pr)−L(z, pr), (3)
where Ψ(pr)≡ (pr−w)[y(pr)+µd] and
L(z, pr)≡ [w− s(1−m)−mµe]Λ(z)+ [pr+m(µe− pr)−w]Θ(z).
Similar to Petruzzi and Dada (1999), we can verify that E[pir(z, pr)] is concave in z for a given
pr. We can then follow a sequential procedure to find the optimal solution. We first find the optimal
retail price p∗r(z) given z, and then find z∗ to maximize E[pir(z, p∗r(z)].
Theorem 1 For the additive demand, if ε is independent of pe, the following properties hold:
(1) For a fixed z, the unique optimal retail price is given by
p∗r(z) =
θ+µd+ aw
2a
− (1−m)Θ(z)
2a
. (4)
(2) If F (·) is a distribution function whose hazard rate satisfies 2r(z)2 + dr(z)/dz > 0 for A≤
z ≤B, and the market liquidity satisfies m< (w− s)/(µe− s), then z∗ is the largest z in the region
[A,B] that satisfies dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz = 0.
(3) If the conditions for (2) are met, and
2maµe− (1+m)aw+(1−m)θ+(1−m)2A+m(1−m)µd > 0,
then z∗ is uniquely determined by dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz = 0.
9For convenience, we relegate all the proofs in this paper to the appendix. The condition m<
(w−s)/(µe−s) can be rewritten as m(µe−w)< (1−m)(w−s). Note that w−s is the loss per unit
because of the inefficiency of the spot market, and µe−w is the earning per unit from speculation.
If the expected gain from the speculation is less than the expected loss due to the inefficiency of
the spot market, the reseller will order a finite quantity by contract. Otherwise, the reseller should
either procure an infinite quantity through contract if w <E[pe] or order zero if w >E[pe], which
is similar to Milner and Kouvelis’s (2007) result.
Proposition 1 With additive demand, if the conditions in Theorem 1(2) are met and w<µe, both
z∗ and p∗r are increasing in m.
In the additive demand case, the effect of m on the optimal order quantity is a tradeoff between
the two opposing effects: the optimal order quantity increases in z∗ and decreases in p∗r.
To understand further how the market liquidity and demand uncertainty affect the reseller’s
strategies and performance, we use the parameter values a= 1.5, w = 10, and s= 6, and assume
(θ + ε) ∼ N(100,202), pe ∼ N(11,22) and ρ = 0.1 (the correlation coefficient between ε and pe).
We focus on analyzing three scenarios with different liquidities: partially liquid with m= 0.4 and
m= 0.7, and no liquidity with m= 0. Hence, the reseller does not participate in the spot market.
As shown in Figure 2, the optimal retail price still increases in m, although the spot price and
the demand are correlated. The optimal order quantity increases in m for different demand uncer-
tainties. With a higher liquidity spot market, the reseller can unload his/her excessive inventory
for a higher value, and so he will order more through contract. As σd increases, the reseller orders
more to protect the demand uncertainty and sets a lower retail price for all three scenarios.
In the multiplicative demand case, we denote z ≡ q/y(pr). The profit function can be rewritten
as
pir(z, pr) =
{
pry(pr)ε−wy(pr)z+ [(1−m)s+mpe]y(pr)(z− ε), ε≤ z,
pry(pr)z−wy(pr)z−m(pe− pr)y(pr)(ε− z), ε > z.
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Analogous to the additive case, if ε is independent of pe the expected profit can be written as
follows:
E[pir(z, pr)] =Ψ(pr)−L(z, pr), (5)
where Ψ(pr)≡ (pr−w)y(pr)µd and
L(z, pr)≡ y(pr)[(w− s(1−m)−mµe)Λ(z)+ (pr+m(µe− pr)−w)Θ(z)].
Theorem 2 For multiplicative demand, if ε is independent of pe, the following properties hold:
(1) For a fixed z, the unique optimal retail price is given by
p∗r(z) =
aw
a− 1 +
a
a− 1
[w− (1−m)s−mµe]Λ(z)+m(µe−w)Θ(z)
µd− (1−m)Θ(z) , (6)
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Fig. 2. Effects of Demand Uncertainty and Market Liquidity in a Risk-neutral Case
(2) If F (·) is a distribution function satisfying 2r(z)2+dr(z)/dz > 0 for A≤ z ≤B, and m< (w−
s)/(µe−s) and a≥ 2, then z∗ is the largest z in the region [A,B] that satisfies dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz =
0.
(3) If the conditions for (2) are met, and ma(µe−w)µd+ [mµd+(1−m)A](w−mµe)> 0, then
z∗ is uniquely determined by dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz = 0.
In the multiplicative demand case, we use the parameter values θ = 2000, a = 3, w = 10, and
s= 6, and assume ε∼N(100,202), pe ∼N(11,22) , and ρ= 0.1. As shown in Figure 2, the optimal
retail price slightly decreases in m, and the order quantity increases in m. We also observe that the
reseller will set a higher retail price for higher σd. However, the order quantity tends to increase in
σd when the liquidity is relatively high and decreases in σd when the liquidity is relatively low.
From the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2, we also find that the spot market uncertainty σe does not
affect the reseller’s strategies if ε is independent of pe. If ε is correlated with pe, our numerical study
shows that the effects of σe and ρ on the reseller’s strategies and performance are insignificant.
5. Strategies of a Risk-averse Reseller
In this section, we first analyze the scenario in which the spot market achieves full liquidity. We
then present some numerical examples to illustrate how the related parameters affect the optimal
strategies of a risk-averse reseller facing both additive and multiplicative demands.
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5.1. Strategies under a Fully Liquid Spot Market
Suppose full liquidity is achieved in the spot market, i.e., m= 1. We can simplify (1) into
pir = prD+ pe(q−D)+−wq− pe(D− q)+
= prD− pe(D− q)−wq. (7)
Usually, price movements in the spot market reflect the overall demand trend. Therefore, when
the spot price pe is high, demand in the resell channel is usually strong. For example, the price
of hot-rolled sheets in a spot market in December 2008 was about 3000 RMB per metric ton,
down from the 5000 RMB per metric ton in June of that year because of the sluggish demand in
China caused by the on-going financial crisis. Therefore, assuming a positive correlation between
the demand in the resell channel and the spot price is reasonable (Seifert et al. 2004). Accordingly,
we assume further that ε and pe together satisfy a bivariate normal distribution with correlation
coefficient 0≤ ρ< 1, i.e., (ε, pe)∼BN [µd, µe, σ2d, σ2e ] . This distribution helps the tractability of the
model, and it has been commonly used in the literature (Chod and Rudi 2005).
We first consider the additive demand function in the resell channel, i.e., D = θ− apr + ε. The
expected value and the variance of the reseller’s profit can be expressed, respectively, as follows
(see Appendix A for details):
E[pir] =−ap2r +(aµe+ θ+µd)pr+(µe−w)q− ρσdσe− (θ+µd)µe, (8)
V ar[pir] = (1− ρ2)σ2d[(pr−µe)2+σ2e ] +α2+4αβµe+4β2µ2e+2β2σ2e , (9)
where α= (aσe + ρσd)pr + qσe − (θ+ µd)σe + ρµeσd and β =−ρσd. Clearly, the expected profit is
a linear function of the order quantity q. A risk-neutral reseller would order an infinite quantity
through contract to speculate in the spot market if µe >w or order zero if µe <w. Such strategy is
unreasonable in practice. Similar to Seifert et al.’s (2004) argument, we only consider the situation
with k > 0, i.e., the case of risk-averse resellers.
To solve the optimization problem, we need the property given in the following lemma:
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Lemma 1 For the additive demand, if k > 0 and σe > 0, the utility function Ur(pr, q) is strictly
joint concave in pr and q.
We have the following theorem to describe the optimal strategy:
Theorem 3 For the additive demand, the optimal retail price and the optimal order quantity for
the risk-averse reseller are unique. They are given as follows:
p∗r = µe+
θ+µd− aµe
2σ(k)
−λ(µe−w), (10)
q∗ = θ+µd− ap∗r +
µe−w
2kσ2e
+
ρσd
σe
(µe− p∗r), (11)
where σ(k)≡ a+ kσ2d(1− ρ2) and λ≡ (a+ ρσd/σe)/[2σ(k)].
The optimal utility for the reseller is now given by
U∗r =
[
σe(θ+µd− 2aµe+ aw)− ρσd(µe−w)
]2
4σ2eσ(k)
+
(µe−w)2
4kσ2e
− ρσdσe
+(µe−w)(θ+µd− aµe)− kσ2eσ2d(1+ ρ2). (12)
From (10), we observe that the reseller’s pricing strategy is different when the reseller participates
in a fully liquid spot market. Instead of using the wholesale price as a starting point, the expected
spot price is used. Starting from µe, the reseller marks the price up by a margin determined by
the risk-adjusted expected potential demand in the resell channel. The parameter λ is positive,
and it represents the retail price sensitivity with respect to the wholesale price. If µe > w, the
reseller benefits from the price premium µe − w, which allows him/her to lower the retail price
proportionally. Conversely, when µe < w, the reseller will set a higher retail price to compensate
for a higher procurement cost through contract.
Equation (11) shows that the optimal order quantity is also strongly influenced by the spot
market. The optimal order quantity is composed of three parts, reflecting a rational procurement
strategy. The first part is the expected demand in the resell channel. The second part is the strategic
quantity. If µe > w, the reseller should order more to speculate in the spot market. However,
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when µe < w, the reseller should order less and expect to meet a part of his/her demand from
the spot procurement. Clearly, this term decreases in k and σe. For a more risk-averse reseller,
there is less incentive to get involved in speculation (procurement) in the spot market. As price
volatility increases, speculating (procuring) in the spot market becomes less attractive to the
reseller. The third part reflects the adjustment function of the spot market. When p∗r < µe, it
is positive, indicating that the reseller can order more from the manufacturer to hedge against
demand uncertainty, as selling this quantity in the spot market may still gain utility if it is not
consumed by the demand in the resell channel. When p∗r > µe, it is negative, indicating that the
reseller will order less from the manufacturer. The reseller can protect himself/herself from the
demand uncertainty by buying from the spot market in case of a shortage in the resell channel.
When ρ= 0, (10), (11) and (12) become less complex, and we have the following result.
Proposition 2 For the additive demand and ρ= 0, the following properties hold:
(1) The optimal retail price is unaffected by σe; the optimal order quantity decreases in σe if
µe >w, and increases in σe if µe <w; and the optimal utility always decreases in σe.
(2) If θ + µd − 2aµe + aw > 0, the optimal retail price decreases in σd, and the optimal order
quantity increases in σd; if θ+µd−2aµe+aw < 0, the optimal retail price increases in σd, and the
optimal order quantity decreases in σd; the optimal utility always decreases in σd.
Let
T =
σe(θ+µd− 2aµe+ aw)
ρσd
. (13)
Proposition 3 For the additive demand and ρ 6= 0, there exists a price premium threshold T such
that when µe−w<T , the optimal retail price decreases in k and becomes greater than the expected
spot price, and the optimal order quantity increases in k if µe <w. When µe−w>T , the optimal
retail price increases in k and becomes smaller than the expected spot price, and the optimal order
quantity decreases in k if µe >w.
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If the value of σe is not very small, the condition µe −w < T will be satisfied. In these cases,
the spot market is not a good channel for buying or selling the product. Then, a more risk-averse
reseller will decrease his/her retail price to stimulate demand in the resell channel. By extensive
numerical experiments, we can show that µe−w<T is always true except under extreme parameter
settings (e.g., a very small price volatility ). In practice, price volatilities in most spot markets in
China are moderate. For example, the maximum price change of steel or crude is less than 25 %
in a month.
Proposition 4 For the additive demand, if ρ 6= 0, the following hold:
(1) The optimal retail price increases in σe if µe >w and decreases in σe if µe <w.
(2) There exists an expected market base threshold B1 that if θ + µd > B1, the optimal order
quantity increases in σe; otherwise, the optimal order quantity decreases in σe.
(3) There exists an expected market base threshold B2 that if θ + µd > B2, the optimal utility
increases in σe; otherwise, the optimal utility decreases in σe.
Our numerical experiment in Section 5.2 shows that the effect of price volatility in the spot
market on the retail price is not very strong. The effect of price volatility on the order quantity is
strong when σe is small and is insignificant when σe is large.
Next, we investigate the multiplicative demand case, i.e., D = θp−ar ε. Similar to the additive
demand, the expected value and the variance of the reseller’s profit can be expressed, respectively,
as follows:
E[pir] = pry(pr)µd− y(pr)(µdµe+ ρσdσe)+ (µe−w)q, (14)
V ar[pir] = y(pr)2(1− ρ2)σ2d[(pr−µe)2+σ2e ] +α2+4αβµe+4β2µ2e+2β2σ2e , (15)
where y(pr) = θp−ar , α= σeq− y(pr)µdσe+ y(pr)ρσd(pr+µe) and β =−ρσdy(pr).
Lemma 2 For the multiplicative demand, if k > 0, σe > 0, and given the retail price pr, the utility
function Ur(pr, q) is strictly concave in q, and
q∗ = µdθp−ar +
µe−w
2kσ2e
+
ρσd
σe
θp−ar (µe− pr). (16)
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Comparing (16) with (11), in the multiplicative case, the optimal order quantity is also composed
of three parts: the expected demand in the resell channel, the speculation (procurement) quantity,
and the adjustment quantity. However, we cannot obtain the closed-form solution for the optimal
retail price. In the next subsection, we provide some numerical examples to examine how the
demand uncertainty, spot price volatility, and correlation coefficient affect the optimal retail price.
5.2. Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we study the effect of the spot market on the strategies and performance of
a risk-averse reseller numerically. We also compare the differences as a result of additive and
multiplicative demands. Throughout this section, we use the general profit function (1) and the
same parameter values as in Section 4, except with k= 0.01.
5.2.1. Effect of Demand Variability. As shown in Figure 3, the optimal retail price
decreases in the demand variability in the additive case but increases in the demand variability
in the multiplicative case. We also observe that the optimal retail price decreases in the market
liquidity in both the additive case and multiplicative case. A reseller participating in a fully liquid
spot market will sell at the lowest price in the resell channel.
When σd increases, a reseller participating in a fully liquid spot market will increase (decrease)
his/her order quantity in the additive (multiplicative) case. In the additive case, the reason is
the sharply reduced retail price stimulating higher demand in the resell channel. However, in the
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Fig. 3. Effect of Demand Variability in a Risk-averse Case (σe = 2, ρ= 0.1)
multiplicative case, a higher order quantity implies a higher risk than that in the additive case so
that the reseller has to reduce his/her order quantity to control risk. With a lower liquidity, the
optimal order quantity decreases in σd in both cases.
Figure 3 also shows that the reseller’s utility decreases as the demand variability increases in
both additive and multiplicative cases. We also find that the utility is more sensitive to market
liquidity as demand variability increases.
5.2.2. Effect of Price Volatility. Figure 4 shows that price volatility has a weaker influence
on the retail price in both the additive and multiplicative cases. The reason is that the main purpose
of setting a retail price is to optimize the utility of the resell channel, and the price volatility has
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less effect on it.
In Figure 4, price volatility has a significant effect on the order quantity in scenarios with a fully
liquid spot market in both the additive and multiplicative cases, whereas it has a smaller effect on
the order quantity in other scenarios. The reason is that, as σe increases, the spot market becomes
less attractive for the reseller to trade, and then he/she will reduce his/her speculative activity in
a fully liquid spot market. When market liquidity is lower (in our example, the liquidity threshold
for speculating is about 0.8), the reseller is not involved in any speculative activity in the spot
market; thus, price volatility has less effect on the order quantity.
We also find that the reseller cannot always benefit from spot trading in the additive case. When
σe is small, the reseller participating in a fully liquid spot market can achieve a significantly higher
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Fig. 4. Effect of Spot Price Volatility in a Risk-averse Case (σd = 20, ρ= 0.1)
utility than those participating in a lower liquid spot market in the additive case. The reason is
that higher liquidity facilitates the reseller to sell his/her surplus, which in turn stimulates the
speculative activity and improves his/her utility. As σe increases, the spot market becomes less
attractive because of the risk caused by spot trading.
5.2.3. Effect of Correlation Coefficient. Figure 5 shows that the optimal retail price
slightly increases as ρ increases in both the additive and multiplicative cases. When market liquidity
increases, the effect of correlation coefficient on the optimal order quantity becomes more signifi-
cant. In scenarios with higher values of liquidity, the optimal order quantity is reduced sharply as
ρ increases. With an increase in ρ, the incentive for ordering more excess inventory to sell through
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Fig. 5. Effect of Correlation Coefficient in a Risk-averse Case
the spot markets decreases. That is, when excess inventory is high, there is less demand in the
resell channel, and the spot price is more likely to be low, and vice versa. Furthermore, in the
additive case, the utility is convex in ρ with a fully liquid spot market, and ρ increases when market
liquidity is lower. However, in the multiplicative case, the utility decreases in these three scenarios.
5.2.4. Summary. Table 1 summarizes the sensitivity analysis on both risk-neutral and risk-
averse cases. The retail price is less sensitive to spot price volatility and the correlation coefficient
in all four cases. However, the risk-averse reseller will significantly reduce the retail price when
demand uncertainty increases in the additive demand case. In sum, to set an appropriate retail
price, a reseller should pay more attention to demand uncertainty and his/her own risk attitude.
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When demand uncertainty is large, the reseller should set a lower retail price if he/her faces an
additive demand, and set a higher price if he/she faces a multiplicative demand. When the liquidity
in the spot market is higher, a reseller should set a lower retail price if he/her faces a multiplicative
demand. However, facing an additive demand, a risk-averse reseller should set a lower retail price,
whereas a risk-neutral reseller should set a higher price.
The optimal order quantity is more sensitive to demand uncertainty and the correlation coef-
ficient. The optimal order quantity may increase or decrease as demand uncertainty increases
depending on different demand functions and risk attitudes. The correlation coefficient has a sig-
nificant negative effect on the optimal order quantity if a risk-averse reseller participates in the
spot market with a higher liquidity. Moreover, price volatility significantly affects the optimal order
quantity when market liquidity is high enough for the reseller to speculate in the spot market, as a
spot market with higher liquidity can better facilitate the reseller’s buying and selling in the spot
market, motivating the reseller to become more involved in speculative activities. However, when
market liquidity is low, the effect of price volatility on the optimal order quantity is insignificant.
Higher demand uncertainty always hurts the reseller in all four cases. However, a higher liquid
spot market does not always improve the reseller’s utility. In the additive case, only when price
volatility is small can participating in a spot market with a higher liquid improve the reseller’s
utility.
Table 1 Summary of Numerical Illustration
Additive Multiplicative
Risk Neutral Risk Averse Risk Neutral Risk Averse
p∗r q
∗ U∗r p
∗
r q
∗ U∗r p
∗
r q
∗ U∗r p
∗
r q
∗ U∗r
m + + + − U U − + + − + +
σd − + − − U − + U − + − −
σe I I I I U − I I I + U −
ρ I I I + − U I I I + − −
Note: +,−, U, I represent increase, decrease, unclear (increase or decrease), and insignificant, respectively.
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6. Conclusion
The advent of B2B spot markets has greatly changed the traditional supply chain structure, and
many resellers have started to conduct business in spot markets, thus adapting themselves to and
taking advantage of this newly–emerging business environment. In this paper, we analyze how the
spot market affects the reseller’s decisions and performance. We study two types of resellers: the
risk-neutral reseller and the risk-averse reseller. For both types, we consider the additive demand
function and the multiplicative demand function, respectively.
We first analyze the cases in which the risk-neutral reseller faces an additive or multiplicative
demand function and obtain the sufficient conditions under which the optimal strategies exist
and are unique. Then, we examine analytically the special case in which a risk-averse reseller
participates in a fully liquid market with additive demand and obtain closed-form solutions to the
optimal pricing and stocking policy. Our study shows that instead of using the wholesale price as a
starting point, the expected spot price is used. Starting from the expected spot price, the reseller
marks the retail price up by a margin determined by the risk-adjusted expected potential demand
in the resell channel. To determine the optimal ordering quantity, a reseller should consider the
speculation function and the adjustment function of the spot market.
Our numerical study shows that to set an appropriate retail price, a reseller should pay close
attention to demand uncertainty and his/her own risk attitude. To decide on the optimal order
quantity, the reseller should be careful of the demand uncertainty, spot price volatility, market
liquidity, and risk attitude. Our numerical study also shows that participating in spot markets
will not always benefit resellers. When price volatility is high, the spot market is less attractive to
risk-averse resellers. Intuitively, a spot market provides a good channel for a reseller to deal with
his/her excessive inventory or shortage, and the reseller can also profit through speculation. These
advantages will benefit the reseller. However, the increased risk taken by the reseller in a spot
market may also offset part or all of the advantages. This finding has an important management
implication for the development of B2B spot markets. For example, there are thousands of resellers
(traders)in the Chinese steel industry. However, only a very small fraction of them has participated
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in spot markets. Avoiding exposure to risk in the spot market may have been a major factor
preventing more resellers from participating in spot markets. As most of the steel resellers in China
are small or medium sized, they have little experience in dealing with such risk. One way to reduce
risk is by hedging, which includes operational hedging and financial hedging (Van Mieghem 2003,
2007). The former involves operational strategies such as postponement decisions and inventory
policies, and the latter involves forward and option contracts.
Note that some factors are not considered in our model and analysis, such as asymmetric infor-
mation and reseller competition. Including these factors in a model should be an interesting topic
for future research. The model presented in this paper assumes one ordering opportunity by the
reseller. Repeated ordering from manufacturers is a prominent characteristic in some industries.
Allowing multiple ordering opportunities by the reseller may also be worth studying in the future.
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Appendix
A. Computing the Mean and Variance in the Additive Case
Let d = µd + ε. The profit for the reseller when he/she participates in a fully liquid spot market with an
additive demand can be rewritten as
pir = prD+ pe(q−D)+−wq− pe(D− q)+
= (apr + q)pe− d(pe− pr)−wq− ap2r .
The expected profit can be computed as
E[pir] = E[(apr + q)pe− d(pe− pr)]− ap2r −wq
= (apr + q− θ−µd)µe− ρσdσe+(θ+µd)pr − ap2r −wq
= −ap2r +(aµe+ θ+µd)pr +(µe−w)q− ρσdσe− (θ+µd)µe.
The variance of profit can be computed as follows:
V ar[pir] = V ar[prd+(apr + q)pe− dpe]
= E{V ar[prd+(apr + q)pe− dpe|pe]}+V ar{E[prd+(apr + q)pe− dpe|pe]}
= E{(pr − pe)2V ar[d|pe]}+V ar{(apr + q)pe+(pr − pe)E[d|pe]}
= E[(pr − pe)2]V ar[d|pe] +V ar{(apr + q)pe+(pr − pe)[θ+µd+ ρσd
σe
(pe−µe)]}
= (1− ρ2)σ2d [(pr −µe)2+σ2e ] +α2+4αβµe+4β2µ2e +2β2σ2e ,
where α= (aσe+ ρσd)pr + qσe− (θ+µd)σe+ ρµeσd and β =−ρσd.
B. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of the first part is similar to that in Petruzzi and Dada (1999), and we
thus omit the details.
dE[pir(z, pr(z))]
dz
=mµe+(1−m)s−w+(1−m)
[
θ+ aw+µd
2a
− (1−m)Θ(z)
2a
− s
]
[1−F (z)].
Let R(z)≡ dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz, then
dR(z)
dz
=−(1−m)f(z)
2a
[
2a
(θ+ aw+µd
2a
− s)− (1−m)Θ(z)− (1−m)[1−F (z)]
r(z)
]
,
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and,
d2R(z)
dz2
=
[
dR(z)/dz
f(z)
]
df(z)
dz
− (1−m)
2f(z)
2a
[
1−F (z)+ f(z)
r(z)
+
[1−F (z)]dr(z)/dz
r(z)2
]
.
Then, we obtain
d2R(z)
dz2
∣∣∣∣
dR(z)/dz=0
=− (1−m)
2f(z)[1−F (z)]
2ar(z)2
[
2r(z)2+
dr(z)
dz
]
.
Under the condition 2r(z)2+dr(z)/dz > 0, R(z) is either monotone or unimodal, which implies that R(z)≡
dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz has at most two roots. If m< (w − s)/(µe − s), R(B) < 0. Therefore, if R(z) has only
one root, it indicates a change in sign for R(z) from positive to negative. Thus, it corresponds to a local
maximum of E[pir(z, pr(z))]. If it has two roots, the larger of the two values corresponds to a local maximum,
and the small corresponds to a local minimum of E[pir(z, pr(z))]. In either case, E[pir(z, pr(z))] has only one
local maximum, identified either as the unique value of z that satisfies R(z) = dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz = 0 or
as the larger of two values of z that satisfies R(z) = 0. As E[pir(z, pr(z))] is unimodal if R(z) has only one
root, a sufficient condition for unimodality of E[pir(z, pr(z))] is R(A)> 0 or, equivalently, 2aR(A)> 0, where
2aR(A) = 2amµe − (1 +m)aw+ (1−m)θ+ (1−m)2A+m(1−m)µd. We obtain the condition in part (3).
This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. We still use the definition in the proof of Theorem 1. By the implicit function
rule, dz∗/dm=L(z∗)/(∂R(z∗)/∂z∗), where L(z∗) =−∂R(z∗)/∂m. Then, we have
L(z∗) = s−µe− (1−m)[1−F (z∗)]Θ(z
∗)
2a
+ [1−F (z∗)][θ+ aw+µd
2a
− s− (1−m)Θ(z
∗)
2a
].
As
[1−F (z∗)][θ+ aw+µd
2a
− s− (1−m)Θ(z
∗)
2a
] =
w− (1−m)s−mµe
1−m ,
so we have that
L(z∗) =−µe−w
1−m −
(1−m)Θ(z∗)[1−F (z∗)]
2a
.
If w<µe, L(z∗)< 0. We also have ∂R(z∗)/∂z∗ < 0, as R(B)< 0, and z∗ is the largest z in the region [A,B]
that satisfies dE[pir(z, pr(z))]/dz = 0, thus, dz∗/dm> 0. We complete the first part of the proof.
Next, we have dp
∗
r
dm
= ∂p
∗
r
∂m
+ ∂p
∗
r
∂z
dz∗
dm
. We can verify that ∂p
∗
r
∂m
= Θ(z
∗)
2a
> 0, and ∂p
∗
r
∂z
= (1−m)[1−F (z
∗)]
2a
> 0. In
conjunction with dz∗/dm> 0, we obtain dp∗r/dm> 0. ¤
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Proof of Theorem 2. A proof of this theorem can be carried out by following a procedure similar to
Theorem 1 and Petruzzi and Dada’s (1999), Thus, we omit the details. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1. The first-order derivatives of Ur(pr, q) are as follows:
∂Ur
∂pr
=−2apr + aµe+ θ+µd− 2k[(1− ρ2)σ2d(pr −µe)+ (aσe+ ρσd)(α+2βµe)],
∂Ur
∂q
= µe−w− 2kσe(α+2βµe).
The second-order derivatives of Ur(pr, q) are given by
∂2Ur
∂p2r
=−2a− 2k[(1− ρ2)σ2d +(aσe+ ρσd)2],
∂2Ur
∂q2
=−2kσ2e ,
∂2Ur
∂pr∂q
=−2kσe(aσe+ ρσd).
Let H denote the Hessian matrix of the reseller’s utility function Ur(pr, q). For kr > 0 and σe > 0, we have
H11 = ∂2Ur/∂p2r < 0,
det(H) = 4akσ2e +4k
2σ2dσ
2
e (1− ρ2)> 0.
Therefore, the Hessian matrix is negatively definite, and the utility function Ur(pr, q) is strictly joint concave
in pr and q. This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 1, a unique optimal retail price p∗r and a unique optimal order quantity
q∗ exist. Applying the first–order necessary and sufficient conditions, we obtain (10) and (11), respectively.
¤
Proof of Proposition 4. We first define two thresholds:
B1 = 3aµe− 2aw+ 2(a+ kσ
2
d)(µe−w)
kρσdσe
,
and
B2 = 2aµe− aw+ (a+ kσ
2
d)(µe−w)
kρσdσe
+
2σ(k)σ2e
µe−w +
4kσ(k)σ3eσd(1+ ρ
2)
ρ(µe−w) .
Then, using the first derivative of which, we can obtain the results. ¤
